In July 2009, the Harper government imposed a visa requirement on all Mexicans traveling to Canada. The Canadian government legitimized its decision by alluding to the rising number of requests for refugee status from Mexico. This article examines the official rhetoric used by Con servative politicians to rationalize this requirement and immigration and refugee law reform. I argue that the imposition of the visa intended to stop refugee claimants from Mexico also serves to criminalize them using official rhetoric and prejudicial language. That discourse im plies the bilateral denial of the human rights crisis created by narcoviolence and corruption.
This article seeks to unpack the official rhetoric used by Conservative politi cians to justify the visa requirement for Mexicans and its implications. Mexican refu gee claimants have been perceived as a problem in Canada because the Conservative government has increasingly claimed that "real" refugees are those waiting destitute in camps overseas. The growing number of Mexican refugee claimants does not fit this profile, and therefore they are assumed by Canadian authorities to be fraudulently trying to come to Canada to take advantage of the refugee and welfare system. The visa requirement was therefore imposed as a control and deterrence mechanism in this dual context of presumed "fraud" and "abuse." These presumptions constructed
Mexican nationals as a "threat" to Canada's national borders and welfare system and, in doing so, rendered refugee claimants undesirable and ungovernable. Such presumptions therefore rationalize the visa requirement in Mexico as well as a larger reform to the refugee determination process in Canada. As part of a larger restrictive policy regime to control people from particular states, the visa measure also crimi nalizes refugee claimants (on an individual and collective/national basis), and erodes human rights in refugee politics by denying the human rights crisis created by nar coviolence and corruption in Mexico. Moreover, the undifferentiated construction of all Mexicans, whether refugee claimants or visitors, as a "threat" to Canada's im migration and refugee system, social welfare, and national borders conveniently dis regards the dominant economic discourse of Mexico as a close political friend and strategic trading partner, the latter view underpinning the perception of Mexico as a "safe country." It is anticipated that the designation of Mexico as a "safe country" by Minister Kenney as part of Canada's refugee and immigration reform will end the visa requirement by affirming that Mexico does not produce refugee claimants, even though violence keeps pushing people out.
After a brief summary of the range of reactions to the visa requirement in Canada and Mexico, I contextualize border controls in the larger tension between migration and the globalized economy, and the constitutive discourse of the "illegality" attrib uted to Mexican migrants in North America. I then examine the particular criminal ization of Mexican refugee claimants through the construction of their claims as "fraudulent" in the official public discourse. I discuss how Conservative politicians' prejudicial official language blaming refugee applicants has been used to justify the visa requirement in Mexico and the reform of the refugee determination system in Canada. The last section looks at how the current narcoviolence in Mexico poses a particular challenge to the definition of "refugee" and Canada's designation of Mexico that for a nonimmigrant visa for the United States. The U.S. visitor visa requires a valid passport, fee payment, travel information, and evidence of funds to cover expenses (United States Department of State, 2012) .
as a "safe country" in the context of its ongoing immigration and refugee reform. My argument is that the normalization of the Mexican refugee claimants as "fraudulent claimants" and "system abusers" in Canada's public discourse was used to rationalize and normalize the need for the visa requirement. Moreover, the designation of Mexico as a "safe country" is based on a complementary political rationality that Mexicans are in no need of protection despite Mexico's narcoviolence and human rights abuse by the state.
VIsA rAtIonAlIzAtIon And reActIons
Canada's visa requirement for Mexican travellers was a severe blow to fragile conti nental trilateralism, and more specifically to the "aspirations of CanadaMexico strate gic partnership" (Studer Noguez, 2009 ). The visa prerequisite significantly challenged the myth of seamless continental integration and accentuated the asymmetrical relation ships among nafta partners. Until now, Mexico saw Canada as the more reasonable, though less important, nafta partner. Bilateral MexicanU.S. trade relations have been very successful but constantly strained by immigration issues specifically related to crossborder mobility and the significant "unauthorized" Mexican population living north of the border. Canada's sudden visa requirement for Mexicans generated a si m ilar anxiety about Canadian border governance politics, now extended from the border itself into the visa offices in Mexico. Literally overnight, the image of Canada in Mexico shifted from that of an open to an exclusionary society.
The announcement of the visa requirement took many people in Canada and in Mexico by surprise -not least the Canadian embassy in Mexico City, who were informed of it only a few days before it was put in place (anonymous, 2009) 
. Prime Minister
Stephen Harper had apparently discussed this possibility with the Calderón admin istration in November 2008 (Studer Noguez, 2009 . Reactions from the Mexican gov ernment, although numerous in the media, were restrained. The requirement was perceived as an "irritant" in the relations between nafta partners and even as a "slap in the face" from a supposedly friendly country (Simpson, 2010: F9) . Many Mexican commentators considered the sudden visa provision as more detrimental to the ma jority of legitimate Mexican travellers to Canada than to the smaller portion of al leged "illegitimate" refugee claimants (Ramírez Meda and Biderbost Moyano, 2011; Ross, 2010: A14) .
Mexican Foreign Affairs Minister Patricia Espinosa officially expressed disagree ment with the measure, but Mexican legislators stopped short of asking for reciprocal visa restrictions given the importance of Canadian tourism for the Mexican economy and Fitzpatrick, 2009) . President Felipe Calderón's reaction was rather subdued in the face of the dispute, stating, "We deeply respect Canada's right to make decisions about its immigration system. However, I must share with you our regret for this series of events and decisions" (Valpy, 2009: A13) . His muted regret was accompanied by an acknowledgement of the surge in "illegitimate" refugee claims created by the opera tions of dubious "intermediary groups and organizations" (i.e., polleros de cuello blanco, or whitecollar people smugglers) in Mexico exploiting Canada's slowmoving refugee determination process (Valpy, 2009; Martínez, 2009) 
. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister
Lawrence Cannon faced the discontent of Mexican officials and business organizations that saw the new measure as running counter to integration efforts in the North Amer ican continent. In an attempt to prevent further diplomatic damage, Cannon initially suggested that the action would be temporary but was nevertheless necessary, given that the number of refugee claims from Mexico "has been above the level that is ac ceptable" (Latin America Data Base, 2009). Calderón, in subsequent official visits, re iterated his hopes that the measure would indeed be temporary, lasting until Canada reforms its immigration and refugee law, something obviously beyond his control.
In Canada, reactions against what has been described as "one of the most per plexing and possibly damaging foreign policy decisions" (Collins, 2009a ) appear more vociferous. The Liberal immigration critic Maurizio Bevilacqua and the ndp immigration critic Olivia Chow argued that a blanket visa requirement on the entire population of a country amounted to nothing less than a damning indictment of the Conservatives' inefficient governing of the refugee determination system (Collins, 2009a) . Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae denounced the visa imposition as a "big step backward" for bilateral relations (quoted in Davis, 2009a Estévez, 2012a; Wright, 2012) .
the chAngIng north AmerIcAn ImmIgrAtIon lAndscApe
The globalized economy has generated an unprecedented pool of migrants by favor ing the internationalization of labor, yet unevenly enabling crossborder mobility. Na tional immigration policies have responded in various ways, many of them favoring highly skilled workers while increasingly relegating lowskilled migrants to tempo rary worker programs and informal economies. For some, moving across borders has become a condition of their cosmopolitan lives and professional activities, expedited by the convenience of border preclearance registration programs. However, for others, moving across borders represents, more than ever, a perilous journey through tighter border controls toward informal and precarious work conditions. According to 2009 United Nations population estimates, 213 million migrants were on the move world wide in 2010. Of this number, 16 million were refugees i.e., people seeking protection in another country. Dauvergne (2008) estimates that, in 2005, 50 million people worldwide were caught in a state of "extralegality" created by the contradictions of economic globalization, state sovereignty, and human rights. These are migrants who do not fit any categories of national immigration laws or international refugee agreements and yet are a growing part of the globalized work force (Dauvergne, 2008; Bacon, 2008; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002) .
Still, people moving outside national legal frameworks or contravening immi gration laws are quickly labeled "illegal." Illegality is associated with anyone entering a country in breach of immigration law or overstaying permitted stays in a country.
Yet, as Dauvergne (2008: 16) argues, the term illegality "underscores a shift in percep tion regarding the moral worthiness of migrants" and creates a moral and national superiority for those perceiving immigration infringements as criminal activity. The labeling of "illegals" has allowed governments, media, and neoconservative groups to reassert rhetorical and moral borders over migrants when official borders remain somewhat porous because of constant labor demands. This perceived criminality is directly linked to migrants' unauthorized presence in a country and their assumed disregard for the "legal immigration" process and queue. But as Carens remarks (2010: 42) , "There are almost no immigration lines for unskilled workers without close family ties to current citizens or residents. Most of those who settle as irregular migrants would have no possibility of getting in through any authorized channel. To say that they should stand in a line which does not exist or does not move is disingenuous." As a result of the contentious relation between the unremitting flows of globalization and the intensified securitization of national borders by sovereign states, immigration and refugee laws have increasingly become the determination of those who must be turned away rather than those who are allowed to enter. Thus, migrants' mobility has been severely curtailed by various governmental technologies, whether visas or any other punitive legislation.
In the face of political rationalities and a regime of rules preoccupied with eco nomic efficiency, national security and safety, and social order based on exclusion, "illegality" emerges as the direct outcome of immigration law (Dauvergne, 2008; Newton, 2008; De Genova, 2004; Bigo, 2002) . As De Genova (2004) demonstrates, the historical interplay between unlimited demands for Mexican labor and the rendering of Mexican labor as distinctly disposable in U.S. immigration law instituted the legal production of Mexican/migrant illegality. In recent years, many governments (the U.S., Canada, and Australia, among others) have created new immigrantrelated crimes, increasing penalties and prosecutions at the border and the workplace, expanding the grounds for being outside the law and therefore expanding the grounds for illegality (Kanstroom, 2004; Dauvergne, 2008) . Migrants are thus rendered "illegals" by a nor malized criminalizing process in immigration laws, public discourses, and neoconser vative politics, and, as Robert Latham (2009) concludes, any solution to border mobility must be framed outside the criminalizing laws but as a challenge to those specific laws.
This convergence of economic globalization and national security has created difficult conditions for many international migrants. Unable to live in their home coun tries due to political and economic uncertainties, they are unable to migrate within the increasingly restrictive national immigration and refugee regimes. Over the years, the reaction of extremeright conservative governments has been to decry and further Canada's recent imposition of visas as a response to the arrival of Mexican refugee claimants is an integral part of a neoliberal discourse of control and security because it acts to extend the discourse of criminality to refugee claimants, that is, to those who have submitted an asylum claim and even to those who have no intention of filing a claim because they now belong to a targeted national group. With the increasing trend of the governance of mobility being seen as a matter of national security, marginalized mi grants and refugees are targeted similarly even though their respective modalities of mobility and exclusion are different. Targeted by punitive policy and populist anti immigration rhetoric, undocumented migrants have a tenuous status stemming from their illicit mode of entry and their construction as criminals, leaving them especially vulnerable to precarious working conditions. Vulnerability and the need to evade au norteamérica thorities hover over undocumented migrants' everyday lives. For refugee or asylum claimants, vulnerability is played out right at their arrival in their demand for pro tection and their obligation to prove they would be persecuted if they returned home.
However, in the nexus of criminality/security given priority by many governments, the presumption of abuse prevails until proof of persecution is officially sanctioned (Pratt, 2005; Dauvergne, 2008; Mountz, 2010) . In a North American context where Mexican migrants are broadly viewed as "illegal" economic migrants, this reputation now in evitably extends to their status as refugee claimants because they are suspected of dis guising economic motivations and circumventing immigration procedures and controls.
refugees At rIsk or "rIsky" refugees and the "detention of all undocumented arrivals until their identity is verified" (quoted in Köhler, 2009 ). Even then, Kenney defended the need for a refugee system that as sists "legitimate" refugees "rather than lawbreakers and queuejumpers" (quoted in Köhler, 2009 ). Kenney claimed that he "cannot tolerate a situation where they see peo ple getting a plane ticket, arriving here, saying the magic word 'refugee,' getting quasi landed status, getting a work permit and/or welfare benefits. That is an insult to the millions of people who aspire to come to Canada legally" (quoted in Köhler, 2009 ).
In the 2009 press release announcing the new visa requirements for Mexico, Kenney argued that recent refugee claims from Mexico represented an objectionable 25 percent of all claims received. 6 Insisting on the dichotomy between "false" and "real" refugees, Kenney insisted that "in addition to creating significant delays and spiraling new costs in our refugee program, the sheer volume of these [Mexican] claims is under mining our ability to help people fleeing real persecution" (quoted in Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2009a). Emphasizing the low 11percent acceptance rate of Mexican refugee claims (compared to an overall rate of 45 percent) by the Immigration and Refugee Board, Kenney unambiguously claimed that "the visa process will allow 5 Over the years, the Immigration and Refugee Board has often accumulated backlogs, but none as long lasting as the estimated 60 000 to 65 000 pending claims restraining the refugee determination process in 2009. The problem resides not solely at the entrance of the system, but rather in the middle and end of it because the Conservative government failed to fill vacancies on the board over time (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009 Zimmerman (2011: 336) observes that "the state's processes of granting or refus ing asylum are central to how meaning is assigned," and "abusive applicants are often framed as being social or economic migrants" and therefore as criminals. The problem of "bogus" or "false" claims and the perception that refugee claimants are economic migrants in disguise rather than "real" refugees fleeing persecution (a dichotomy also described as fraudulent and genuine, deserving and undeserving, desirable and un desirable) is based on political and other forms of violence and does not recognize socioeconomic issues. These categorizations are based on a moralistic discourse that considers both the conduct and motivation of refugee claimants wrong and suspect.
This discourse operates on the assumption that genuinely deserving refugees are languishing in camps overseas and therefore claimants who actually arrive in Canada are less in need of protection and consequently less likely to be "genuine" refugees (Pratt, 2005) . Adding to this problematic assumption of un/deserving claimants is the neoliberal credo that values the entrepreneurial ethos and stigmatizes the person in need as immediately suspected of not contributing or abusing the state's largesse. Mex ican refugee claimants in Canada, as explicitly stated by Conservative politicians, were widely assumed to be fraudulently trying to take unfair advantage of the system. As
Pratt demonstrates (2005: 216) , "The emergence and conflation of the problems of the 'bogus refugee' and the 'welfare cheat' and the way in which these linked threats [are] framed by the crimesecurity nexus and the specter of fraud . . . produced a powerful, new, hybrid threat -the fraudulent criminal refugee." The deserving refugee "at risk" then becomes widely recast as the "risky" refugee (Pratt, 2005: 18) . In the case of Mex ican refugee claimants, the visa requirement served first and foremost as a deterrence and risk management technology, where risk is constituted by moral considerations shaping the deserving and undeserving.
In maintaining a sharp distinction between "false" and "real" refugee claimants in their public addresses, Harper and Kenney have been seen as preempting decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the independent administrative tribunal sole ly responsible for determining the admissibility of refugee claims in Canada, by con cluding that the majority of Mexican claimants are "bogus refugee claimants" by insisting that "real" refugees are overseas (Collins, 2009a) . While, as minister, Kenney has discretionary powers to admit claimants on particular humanitarian grounds, his explicit position on alleged "bogus" claimants has been increasingly perceived as political interference in due process (already significantly discretionary) by creating systematic discrimination and prejudice against a targeted group of claimants. Political discourses legitimize a winwin situation for both visa enforcement and legislative reform. The minister's discretionary power to unilaterally develop a list of designat ed safe countries of origin (or parts of countries or groups) for the purpose of expe dited processing was first legislated in the 2010 Balanced Refugee Reform Act and reasserted in the 2012 Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act (Parliament of Canada, 2010; 2011). 7 While imposing a visa on a particular country is within the power of the Ca nadian government, linking the visa requirement to the need to curtail socalled "bogus" refugee claims from a specific national group is misguided because international re f ugee law stipulates that each claim must be examined individually. Questioning the legitimacy of refugee claimants and deterring claims have been ways to impair and erode refugee applicants' human rights by reasserting border control. Many expert organizations, such as Amnesty International (2009) immigration who has made such remarks, who has intruded on the judicial process in this way" (quoted in Collins, 2009b) . Such comments were echoed by the Refugee Lawyer's Association of Toronto, which contends that "Canadian public should be shocked that a minister would interfere in the work of an independent body" (quoted in Collins, 2009b) . Such prejudicial bias is seen as particularly problematic given that, under the recent refugee law changes, the minister will have full discretion over determining Canada's list of designated countries of origin or the socalled list of "safe countries," i.e., "countries that do not normally produce refugees" (Citizenship (Estévez, 2012a: 24; Luthnow, 2012) . Mexican authorities have claimed that the drug war has been limited to certain states and cities where criminals are killing each other. However, others have argued that it has unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence and insecurity throughout the whole country (Wright, 2012; Estévez, 2012a) . As Wright remarks (2012) , while the brutality of the narcoviolence and conflicts created by both criminal activities and military harassment might be concentrated in certain areas, it is nevertheless part of the consciousness of all Mexicans (inside and outside Mexico).
The drug war has led to a serious human rights crisis. According to Amnesty
International's 2012 annual report, drug cartels and other criminal gangs, sometimes acting in collusion with police and public officials, are responsible for human rights abuses including kidnapping, rape, and murder. Migrants, journalists, women, and defenders of human rights have been the victims of killings or numerous threats that have never been investigated (Estévez, 2012a; Wright, 2012; Amnesty International, 2012) . Such human rights violations, along with others such as intimidation, torture, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and the use of excessive force are widely reported, but the large majority of these abuses go unpunished. In fact, the Mexican government considers such violations "exceptional" and remains without effective measures to prevent, investigate, or punish serious human rights violations committed by criminal organizations and police forces (Estévez, 2012b; Amnesty International, 2012) . It is in the absence of state protection that violence against citizens becomes a human rights violation. In that sense, García Clarck (2011: 13) argues the "human rights crisis in Mexico is a crisis of distrust of the Mexican state's capacity to safeguard its citizens' fundamental rights. A determining factor in this distrust is institutional inefficacy, manifested particularly in a highcost public security policy with negligible results, as well as the partisan bias and inconsistency in the administration of justice."
The human rights crisis in Mexico has therefore been exacerbated by a high level of impunity, and, as Estévez (2012a: 23) argues, "Impunity in Mexico is not simply the result of incompetence or the inability to investigate, but the consequence of the high levels of corruption and the penetration of the criminal justice system and the police forces." In its incapacity to protect its citizens, the state becomes involved in perpetu ating these human rights violations.
The nature of narcoviolence and impunity in human rights violations pose a particular challenge to the dominant understanding of asylum seekers or refugee claimants as persons suffering persecution and being unable to secure any form of protection. By insisting that human rights violations are exceptional or letting them go unanswered (due to a lack of judicial investigation) and affirming that the violence generated by the drug war is concentrated in certain areas (and therefore persons displaced by violence can actually relocate to another area), the Mexican state has con structed citizens needing and seeking protection outside of the conventional defini tion of the "asylum seeker." The government's discourse of drug violence therefore normalizes "a blamethevictim story," where drug violence is presented as strictly internal to the drug trade, i.e., perpetrated by criminals against criminals and there fore not affecting lawabiding citizens (Wright, 2012) . As Wright explains, A key component of this discourse is that the murderers target people for specific reasons; the violence is not random. Since these reasons are internal to the drug trade, the general public cannot know them, but as the violence reflects the killing of criminals by criminals, the general public, which is largely innocent of criminal activity, need not worry. (2012: 572) Still, between 2006 and 2010, 44 019 Mexicans sought protection and asylum in other countries, 13 700 of them in the United States and 30 142 in Canada (Estévez, 2012a: 29) . The majority of these asylum applications are being systematically re jected in the United States and Canada on the basis that victims of drug wars are not seen as "refugees" and on the premise that the Mexican state is able to protect its citi zens. Such claims about the Mexican government's ability to control rather than normal ize and depoliticize the ongoing narcoviolence are increasingly contested. According to García Clarck, "To climb out of this crisis, constitutional and legal reforms are need ed, as are more effective public policies and, of course, a real commitment by the authorities to the defense and promotion of human rights" (2011: 13) . In the mean time, Mexicans have increasingly sought asylum in other countries, notably in Spain, Sweden, France, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Norway. The rise in the number of applications to European countries is motivated by the fear of violence and persecution (Estévez, 2012a: 30) .
conclusIon
On the day following the imposition of the visa requirements for Mexicans, an article in the Toronto daily newspaper Globe and Mail reported that Kenney was planning an overhaul of Canada's refugee system using the United Kingdom system as a model (Clark, 2009) . That model screens claimants according to their national origins (rath er than individual circumstances) in order to reject or fasttrack their refugee status.
Only refugees from conflict zones and totalitarian regimes would then be able to claim asylum, thus drastically reducing access to the refugee system. Based on this position, it is not surprising that Canadian authorities feel they can legitimately preempt the cases of Mexican refugee claimants as "fraudulent." While the minister claims that the new refugee reforms would not limit access to refugee applicants from "safe coun tries," rhetorical distortions have already criminalized Mexicans as "abusers" of the Canadian refugee system. Through this construct of alleged abuse, politicians have reduced a complex migration condition to "bogus" claims, trivialized refugee and human rights, and failed to appreciate Mexico's complex political reality.
The minister will have full power to compile the list of socalled "safe countries,"
i.e., "countries that do not normally produce refugees, that have a robust human rights record, and offer strong state protection" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010) .
The problem with the ministerial power to predetermine claims from allegedly "safe" countries is that this kind of approach challenges international law, which requires individual assessment of protection needs. The compilation of such a list is also fraught with potential for conflict in international relations, sensationalist media reporting, misinformation, and the misrepresentation of complex issues, as well as the politici zation of screening approaches, particularly in an amplified context of national secu rity. As Dauvergne (2008) reminds us, refugee law should not be about protecting In designating Mexico as a "safe country," Canada would eliminate the need for the visa, but only by denying the human rights crisis created by the violent drug wars
